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Abstract:   
Fishers are faced with multiple risks, including unpredictability of future catch rates, prices and costs. 
While the latter are largely beyond the control of fisheries managers, effective fisheries management 
should reduce uncertainty about future catches. Different management instruments are likely to have 
different  impacts  on  the  risk  perception  of fishers,  and  this  should  manifest  itself in  their  implicit 
discount rate. Assuming licence and quota values represent the net present value of the flow of 
expected future profits, then a proxy for the implicit discount rate of vessels in a fishery can be derived 
by the ratio of the average level of profits to the average licence/quota value. From this, an indication 
of  the  risk  perception  can  be  derived,  assuming  higher  discount  rates  reflect  higher  levels  of 
systematic risk. In this paper, we apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to determine the risk 
premium implicit in the discount rates for a range of Australian fisheries, and compare this with the set 
of  management  instruments  in  place.  We  test  the  assumption  that  rights  based  management 
instruments lower perceptions of risk in fisheries. We find little evidence to support this assumption, 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fisheries are characterised by relatively high levels of uncertainty. Environmental fluctuations can 
affect both the availability and distribution of the fish stocks. Given that fishing activity is based on the 
pursuit of an unseen fugitive resource, catches are a result of both luck and skill of the fisher in 
reading and interpreting the environmental conditions. Technological developments can help improve 
the skill component by substituting knowledge and instinct with gadgetry, reducing the difference 
between  the  best  and  average fisher.  However,  day-to-day  catches  still  involves  a  large random 
component. 
 
Fisheries management can also influence risk and uncertainty in fisheries. In open access fisheries, 
the number of potential competitors for the limited resource is variable, and incentives to race to fish 
exist as a result of the potential for lower future catches due to overexploitation. The introduction of 
limited entry reduces the level of uncertainty regarding the number of potential competitors, but each 
competitor  generally has little incentive to conserve the resource due to their inability to limit the 
catches of their counterparts. The introduction of rights based management measures, particularly 
individual quotas, is generally considered to reduce the incentive to race to fish. Under such systems, 
the total allowable catch (TAC) as well as the individual fishers’ shares are known, and fishers can 
concentrate on when and how to catch their share with a reasonable degree of certainty that their 
share will be available. 
 
A link between the level of uncertainty inherent in a fisheries management system and the fishers’ 
discount  rate  is  often  assumed  in  the  fisheries  economics  literature.  Under  highly  competitive 
conditions  (open  access  or  limited  entry),  fishers  are  generally  assumed  to  have  relatively  high 
discount rates (e.g. Curtis 2002). In contrast, the introduction of rights based management systems is 
believed  to  result  in  lower  discount  rates  as  fishers  adjust  their  relative  time  preferences  and 
uncertainty about future catches decreased (e.g. Grafton 1996; Asche 2001; Alcock 2006).  
 
Empirical testing of this assumption has been limited, and is largely part of the body of perceived 
wisdom  relating  to  fisheries  economics.  Asche  (2001)  found  some  evidence  that  discount  rates 
decreased as an individual transferable quota (ITQ) program became established over time, although 
Hannesson (1996) found that high discount rates persisted for some time under ITQ programs. In 
contrast, Newell et al (2005) found that implicit discount rates were roughly equivalent to the risk free 
rate in New Zealand fisheries where ITQs are well established. 
 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the implicit discount rate and the type of fisheries 
management using a cross section of Australian fisheries with varying management regimes. We 
apply a variant of a finance-based model – the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – to estimate the 
relative  risk  premium  associated  with  each  fishery,  reflecting  its  level  of  undiversifiable  risk 
(systematic risk). We use panel data methods to estimate the risk premium, with slope and intercept 






In theory, licence values represent the discounted value of expected future economic profits in the 
fishery (Arnason 1990; Batstone and Sharp 2003). Assuming that expectations of future economic 
profits are based on current returns, then we would assume that licence values would be given by: 
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where L is the licence value, P is the level of economic profit, V is the total cash variable costs, F is 
the fixed costs (including economic depreciation), K is the capital value of the vessel and gear, and i 
is the discount rate (equivalent to the opportunity cost of capital). Given this, the implicit discount rate 
can be given by:  
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which is equivalent to the rate of return on total capital (vessel, gear and licence). 
 
Most industries have a risk premium associated with their discount rate reflecting the relative level of 
risk  associated  with  the  investment.  This  premium  increases  and  decreases  in  proportion  to  the 
relative level of risk, and may represent either a fixed premium or a proportion premium over and 
above the risk free discount rate. That is:  
 
  r i   (3) 
 
where a represents   fixed risk premium,   represents a proportional risk premium, r is the risk-free 
interest rate and   is a random error that represents divergences from the relationship in any one 
particular time period. 
 
The measurement of risk premiums is a well developed area in the finance literature. The traditional 
model used is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965). The intuition 
behind the model is relatively straight forward. Risk and return is expressed as a linear relationship 
where the higher the level of systematic risk of an asset the greater its return. The model is expressed 
in terms of deviations from the risk-free rate of both the firm being examined as well as the market 
rate of return (representing an opportunity cost of capital). The CAPM assumes that: 
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where m is the market rate of return. The beta value ( ) represents the systematic risk of a firm 
divided through by the total risk of the market portfolio (all systematic risk). It is therefore an index of 
the firm’s risk relative to total market risk, commonly referred to as the risk premium. A beta value 
greater than 1 (resulting in a higher expected required rate of return) would therefore indicate that the 
firm  has  an  inherently  greater  risk  than  that  of  the  market.  In  a  financial  context,  a  further 
interpretation  of  beta  is  that  high  share  beta  (>1)  will  tend  to  outperform  the  market  return 
(underperform for low betas <1) when the market return is rising. If beta is equal to one, the firm’s risk 
and return is equivalent to the market risk and return. An assumption of the CAPM model is that  =0. 
Values of  >0 or  <0 suggest that some other factor (in addition to systematic risk) is explaining the 
assets rate of return. 
 
The linear relationship is based on the assumption that the market only rewards risk that cannot be 
diversified away by holding a well diversified portfolio of assets. Systematic, or non-diversifiable risk, 
is generally summarised in most key financial texts as related to the sensitivity of a firm’s revenues to 
macroeconomic factors, its proportion of fixed to variable costs and the level of financial gearing (see  
  3 
Copeland  and  Weston  1992;  Brealey  et  al  2000).  In  the  context  of  fisheries,  management  is 
effectively a component of the macroeconomic environment in which the vessels operate. 
 
The empirical estimation of rates of return using either CAPM or its variants in natural resources has 
largely been confined data rich resource industries including mining (e.g. McClain et al 1996; Cairns 
1982),  timber  (e.g.  Sadorsky  and  Henriques  2001)  and  agriculture  (e.g.  Gu  1996).  Of  these, 
agricultural applications are likely to be a more relevant comparator to fisheries. Earlier studies in the 
US generally concluded that agriculture had a higher than expected risk premium (Barry 1980; Irwin 
1988), while later studies concluded that the estimated risk associated with agricultural assets was 
low (Bjornson and Innes, 1992; Arthur et al. 1998), possibly reflecting changes in agricultural policy. In 
the UK, Gu (1996) found that risk premiums varied depended on farming type, although in all cases 
the beta values were less than one and in most cases less than 0.5, possibly a reflection of the 
protection given to these industries under the European common agricultural policy. 
 
Examples of use of the CAPM model in fisheries are limited. Newell et al (2005) found that the   
coefficient reflecting the risk of holding New Zealand fishing quota relative to the New Zealand stock 
market was not statistically different from zero, suggesting little undiversifiable risk associated with 
holding fishing quota. This also implies that the appropriate discount rate for the industry is close to 





Financial performance indicators for Australian fisheries are limited. However, information on rates of 
return to capital were available for a number of fisheries over the period 1992-93 to 2007-08 (Table 
1), based on economic surveys conducted by ABARE (Commonwealth fisheries) and EconSearch 
(South  Australian  fisheries).
1  Data  were  not  available  for  each  fishery  in  each  year.  The  main 
management measure in place each year was also derived from management reports and survey 
reports. While many variations in management types exist, and changes within these types occur over 
time, management was classified as either non -transferable input controls (limited entry, closures, 
gear restrictions etc); individual transferable effort quotas (ITEs  – tradeable days at sea, gear units 
etc) and individual transferable catch quotas (ITQs) (Table 1). The set of available data resulted in 
most of the three types of management being represented in each year of the data (Table 2), with a 
total of 164 observations 
 
For most Commonwealth fisheries, economic surveys were conducted every second year, although 
licence values were estimated only for the year of the survey (resulting in every other year  being 
unusable). Changes in fishery definition and reporting over time also resulted in incomplete data 
series for each fishery. For example, the south east trawl, south east non-trawl and southern shark 
fisheries were merged into the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) over the 
period of the data. Earlier surveys reported on these fisheries separately, and disaggregated the 
fisheries into sub-components (e.g. Danish seine, inshore and offshore trawlers). More recent surveys 
reported only a combined trawl sector and gillnet hook and trap sector. For the South Australian 
fisheries, a more consistent continuous data series was available, although for some fisheries data 
were only available for the more recent years. 
 
                                                 
1 These  data  were  extracted from  a number  of different survey reports  available  on the respective  organisations  websites: 
www.abare.gov.au and www.econsearch.com.au.   
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Table 1. Fishing sectors included in the analysis and their management over the period of the data 
Fishery 
Non-transferable 
Input controls  ITE  ITQ 
Commonwealth fisheries       
Commonwealth trawl sector (combined)      X 
Danish seine       X 
Inshore Trawl boats      X 
Offshore Trawl boats      X 
Gillnet (shark boats)  X    X 
Gillnet, hook and trap (combined)  X    X 
Hook and trap (non trawl)  X    X 
Eastern tuna and billfish fishery  X     
Northern Prawn Fishery  X  X   
Torres Strait Prawn Fisheries    X   
South Australian fisheries       
Abalone fishery      X 
Blue Crab fishery      X 
Gulf St Vincent Prawn Fishery  X     
Spencer Gulf and West Coast Prawn Fishery  X     
Lakes and Coorong Fishery  X     
Northern Zone Rock lobster   X    X 
Southern Zone Rock lobster       X 
Sardine fishery      X 
Scalefish fishery  X     
 




Input controls  ITE  ITQ  Total  
1993  1  0  4  5 
1994  2  1  3  6 
1995  0  1  0  1 
1996  1  1  4  6 
1997  2  0  0  2 
1998  6  1  6  13 
1999  6  0  4  10 
2000  5  1  7  13 
2001  5  0  4  9 
2002  4  2  8  14 
2003  6  0  8  14 
2004  5  2  9  16 
2005  5  2  9  16 
2006  5  2  7  14 
2007  5  2  7  14 
2008  4  2  5  11 
Total  62  17  85  164 
a) e.g. the year 1993 refers to 1992-93 etc 
 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 General trends in rates of return 
 
The distributions of rates of return for the different fisheries are illustrated in Figure 1. Fisheries are 
grouped by their main management measures. From Table 1, several fisheries had periods of input 
controls  prior  to  adopting  ITQs  as  a  main  management  measure.  The  rates  of  return  for  these 
fisheries were not separated out by management measure due to the limited data. However, these 
fisheries are grouped separately in Figure 1. From Figure 1, it appears that the average rates of return 
– the assumed measure of the implicit discount rate – are generally higher for ITQ fisheries than input 
control  fisheries,  although  given  the  distributions  around  the  means  these  differences  are  not 
statistically significant.  
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Figure 2. Rates of return for each fishery over the period of the data 
 
While rates of return were apparently higher in ITQ fisheries, the interannual variation in these rates 
was substantially lower than other forms of management (Table 3). These suggest that ITQs either 
create greater stability in the fishery in terms of economic performance, or that licence/quota values 
are quicker to adapt to changes in average performance. This may be the case if licence values in 
input control based fisheries are more indicative of option value rather than reflect the discounted 
future returns in the fishery. 
 
Table 3. Average rates of return by management type 
Management type  Average rate of return  Average coefficient of variation 
ITQ fisheries  6.7%  55% 
Input/ITQ  4.4%  174% 
ITE  4.1%  88% 
Input only  3.1%  1367% 
 
 
4.2 Econometric analysis 
 
The  introduction  of  rights  based  management  is  generally  believed  to  result  in  a  longer  term 
perspective being adopted by the industry. Consequently, it would be expected that the   value in 
fisheries with some form of rights based management would be lower than that in command and 
control fisheries.  
 
Most financial studies estimate the CAPM model to derive   values for each individual investment. 
However, given the sparsity of data available for the analysis for each fishery, the CAPM model was 
estimated  using  a  panel  data modelling  approach.
2  An advantage of this was that the effects of 
management on   and   could be derived directly through the incorporation of management specific 
dummy variables into the analysis, such that:.  
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Where  Dk  are  a  set  of  dummy variables  representing  different management interventions,  k,  the 
subscript j represents the fishery and t represents the year. As noted previously, given the limited data 
set,  only  three  management  types  were  considered:  input  controls  (non  transferable),  individual 
transferable effort quotas and individual transferable quotas. The dummy variable relating to ITQs 
was excluded from the model to avoid the “dummy variable trap”.  
 
The CAPM model generally uses a standard stock market rate of return for comparison with the return 
on investment in the company, portfolio or sector in question. Initial analysis using the rates of return 
from  the  ASX  All  Ordinaries
3  to  represent  the  market  return  resulted in  a  negative  relationship 
between rates of return in fisheries and the market (Table 4). As we are not interested in the beta 
values per se, but how the risk premium is affected by the type of management in the fishery, an 
alternative  comparator  was  sought.  It  could  be  argued  that  investing  in  the  fishing  industry  is 
considerably different to investing in the stock market in terms of the risks faced, which (excluding 
management failure) are largely environmentally driven. A potentially more appropriate comparator is 
the return on investment in agriculture. Data on rates of return in Australian agriculture (all industries 
excluding  dairy)  were  derived  from  the  ABARE  Agsurf  survey  database.
4  The  rate  of  return  in 
agriculture was closer to that of fisheries (Figure 2), with an apparent structural change occurring 
between 1999-00 and 2000-01.  
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of average rates of return: Australian agriculture, fisheries and the ASX All 
Ordinaries, 1993-2008 
 
The modified CAPM was estimated with the return to agriculture as the “market” indicator. A dummy 
variable representing the apparent structural change from 2000-01 was also included in the model as 
a shift parameter. The derived beta values represent the degree to which risk in fisheries diverges 
from that in agriculture rather than the traditional interpretation of beta in the CAPM model. 
 
The model results for the CAPM and modified CAPM are given in Table 4. The model was estimated 
using a fixed effects formulation as there a priori evidence to suggest that the sample was not drawn 
                                                 
3 Derived from Yahoo finance http://au.finance.yahoo.com/indices.  































  7 
from  a  normal  distribution.  For  example,  one  fishery  under  ITQ  management  (the  offshore  trawl 
sector) was characterised by persistent high rates of return. However, this fishery was effectively a 
mining  operation  based  on  orange  roughy  –  a  long  lived  species  with  a  very  low  growth  rate. 
Consequently, investment in the fishery needed to be recovered in a relatively short time period as 
the fishery was relatively short lived. Conversely, one South Australian fishery (the Scalefish fishery) 
had persistently negative rates of return. A random effects model was also estimated for comparison, 
and the specification tested using the Hausman test (Table 5). The results suggested that a random 




Table 4. CAPM model results – fixed effect specification 
  CAPM    Modified CAPM 
Variable  Coef 
Std. 
Error  t-Stat  Coef 
Std. 
Error  t-Stat  Coef 
Std. 
Error  t-Stat 
                   
Alpha  -0.020  0.009  -2.229  0.000  0.013  -0.028  0.003  0.010  0.319 
Beta  -0.047  0.041  -1.132  0.300  0.212  1.411  0.236  0.195  1.208 
Input controls  0.016  0.016  0.969  0.005  0.013  0.353       
ITE  0.008  0.029  0.269  0.009  0.022  0.427       
Input control slope  -0.026  0.067  -0.387  -0.186  0.216  -0.863       
ITE slope  -0.131  0.107  -1.223  -0.082  0.328  -0.251       
Structural shift        -0.026  0.014  -1.888  -0.028  0.014  -2.024 
                   
R-squared  0.601        0.602      0.599   
Adjusted R-squared  0.536        0.533      0.543   
Log likelihood  326.21        326.32      325.67   
F-statistic  9.191        8.764      10.698   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000        0.000      0.000   
AIC  -3.685        -3.675      -3.717   
 
Table 5. Specification tests (modified CAPM) 
  Chi-Sq. Statistic  Chi-Sq. d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section random (Hausman)  5.722  6  0.455 
LR test no management effects  1.113  4  0.892 
LR test no ITQ effect (Table 6)  1.061  1  0.303 
 
From Table 4, the two input based management systems both had positive intercept shift parameters, 
and negative slope parameters.  A priori, it would have been expected that both would have had 
positive slope parameters as it would have been expected that the greater rights embodied in ITQs 
would have resulted in a lower   than the alternative systems. However, all of the parameters were 
individually not significant from zero, although the model overall was significant (based on the F-
statistic). Removing the management related dummy variables had no significant impact on the model 
based  on  an  LR  test  (Table  5).  Further,  the  AIC  value  for  the  model  without  the  management 
interventions  was  lower  than  that  with  the management  dummy variables,  suggesting  the former 
model was more appropriate. This suggests that the type of management in place has no significant 
                                                 
5 As the data came from two separate sources, differences in estimation approaches may account for some of the difference in 
rates  of  return.  A  dummy  variable  was  included  in  initial  analyses  to  examine  the  effect  of  data  source,  but  this  was  not 
significant so was excluded in subsequent analyses.  
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impact on the implicit discount rate. The low   value also suggests that fisheries have a substantially 
lower risk premium than agriculture – contrary to expectations. 
 
Given that the CAPM was derived based on the average market return representing a return on a well 
diversified investment, interpretation of the parameters in the previous modified model may differ to 
the usual interpretation. Agriculture is not necessarily representative of a diversified asset, so the beta 
values may not capture systematic risk only. As an alternative model, the risk premium associated 
with fisheries was examined directly by comparing the rates of return in the fisheries with the risk free 
interest rate (as in equation 3). A dummy variable representing ITQs only was introduced into the 
model as a slope shifter. From the results (Table 6), the parameter relating to ITQs was negative as 
expected, suggesting that ITQ based fisheries have a lower risk premium than non-ITQ fisheries. 
However,  again,  this  parameter  was  not  significant.  Further,  excluding  the  parameter  had  no 
significant impact  on  the model (LR  test  Table  5)  suggesting  that  the management  type  has  no 
significant impact on the risk premium.  
 
Table 6. Rates of return compared to risk free interest rates – fixed effect specification 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic    Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic 
               
C  -0.009  0.033  -0.265    -0.020  0.032  -0.628 
Interest  1.023  0.517  1.977    1.066  0.515  2.069 
ITQ slope  -0.016  0.013  -1.297         
               
R-squared  0.599        0.597   
Adjusted R-squared  0.543        0.544   
Log likelihood  322.187        321.657   
F-statistic  10.696        11.216   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000        0.000   
Akaike info criterion  -3.673        -3.679   
 
The results also suggest that the risk premium associated with fisheries is, on average, generally 
small. From Table 5, the slope associated with the risk free interest rate was not significantly greater 




Using the CAPM approach to examine the risk perceptions in fisheries proved problematic, as the 
excess returns to capital (rate of return less the risk free interest rate) in fisheries was unrelated to the 
excess returns in the stock market – the traditional measure of a diversified investment. Newell et al 
(2005) assumed that the zero beta value in their study meant that there was little undiversifiable risk 
associated with holding fishing quota, and that the appropriate discount rate for the industry was close 
to the risk-free rate. From our study, the CAPM is most likely unsuitable for assessing risk perceptions 
in the fishing industry. Modifying the CAPM to use agricultural returns rather than the stock market as 
the benchmark may offer potential if the objective is to examine the relative effects of management on 
risk perceptions, but the values themselves may have no real interpretation. Returns to agriculture 
may include non-systemic risk, so the derived “beta” values will not necessarily reflect systemic risk 
perceptions. 
 
The traditional CAPM has several other weaknesses. It is based on a restrictive set of assumptions 
relating to markets (including perfect information, no transaction costs, perfectly competitive capital  
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markets) and investor behaviour (rational and risk adverse, able to borrow and lend at the risk free 
rate and hold well diversified portfolios therefore are only exposed to systematic risk). Whilst empirical 
tests of CAPM suggest a linear relationship between risk and return, results also indicate that there is 
something additional to systematic risk explaining return. That is, the intercept term generally does 
not equal zero. Empirical estimates of CAPM have also found that the actual slope of CAPM is less 
than predictive slope. That is high betas give slightly lower returns and low betas give slightly higher 
returns than predicted (Black 1993; Fama and French 1992). Finally, the ability to test the CAPM was 
argued to be impossible by Roll (1977) because of the market portfolio could not be identified and the 
stock market indices were a poor substitute (as the market portfolio should include all asses e.g. 
bonds, property etc). For reviews of the CAPM model  
 
Alternative models have been developed to overcome some of the above issues. These include two 
factor models including Capital asset pricing model under uncertain inflation (CAPMUI) (Roll 1977; 
Friend 1976, Brueggeman et al 1984) and multi factor models such as Arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 
(Ross  1976)  However  these  model  are  also  not  free  of  issues  empirical  estimation  issues.  For 
example, APT is a multi-factor model where expected risk premium on an asset depends on an 
asset’s exposure to n macro economics factors that affect the assets returns (e.g. inflation, level of 
industrial activity, short and long interest rates and spread between yields of high and low corporate 
bonds (Brealey et al 2000) Other sources of risk may reflect characteristics specific to a firm’s industry 
or sector. Risk is still only determined by factor risk, the underlying assumption of APT is still that 
unique risk is diversified away. Whilst, the APT does have greater intuitive appeal than CAPM, it is not 
without estimation difficulties, the key being identification of relevant factors.  
 
The usual approach to estimating beta values is to estimate each firm or portfolio separately. Most 
studies use fine scale data – daily or weekly – with relatively large quantities of data. In the case of 
fisheries, data are only available at an annual level, and in most cases the series is discontinuous. 
Too  few  observations  were  available  for  any  meaningful  analysis  using  a  standard  approach, 
necessitating a pooling of data and panel data estimation techniques. However, this approach had 
additional advantages as it allowed the potential effects of different management systems on risk 
perceptions to be assessed directly in the model. 
 
The use of rates of returns in fishing also is problematic. Most fisheries that have moved to ITQs have 
experienced increased levels of profit (Grafton 1996) as well as increased licence values (Copes 
1986). Conversely, poor management may be expected to result in low levels of economic profit, so it 
would  be  expected  that  returns  to  capital  in  fisheries  would  be  low  that  are  not  managed  well. 
However, this would also be expected to be reflected in their licence values – a poorly managed 
fishery  would be expected to have a low licence value relative to vessel capital. However, in all 
fisheries examined, licence values represented a substantial proportion of the total capital (Figure 3).  
 
Both Hannesson (1996) and Asche (2001) noted that the move to ITQs was not immediately followed 
by  a  decline  in  the  implicit  discount  rate,  suggesting  that  increased  experience  with  the  system 
reduces uncertainty around the system. The models used in the analysis did not allow for changes in 
the discount rate over time, and for some of the ITQ fisheries, data were only available for a few years 
after the introduction of ITQs. The higher apparent rates of return observed in Figure 2 may reflect 
this lag in adjustment of implicit discount rates, resulting in lower license values than may occur in the 
longer term.   
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Figure 3. Licence/quota values as a share of total capital value (licence plus physical capital) 
 
The potential for measurement error in the estimation of the licence/quota values also exists. For 
most  of  the  non-ITQ  fisheries,  the  number  of  licences  traded  each  year  was  limited.  Obtaining 
accurate  values  in  such  situations  is  complex,  and  errors  in  estimation  will  affect  the  resultant 
estimated rate of return. In ITQ fisheries, trading is more frequent, although the lack of a central 
market  for  quota  makes  determining  the  true  quota  price  difficult.  Most  trades  are  undertaken 
between individuals for undisclosed amounts. Consequently, fishers’ estimates of the total value of 
their quota holdings may be based on imperfect information. 
 
Where ITQs have been introduced in Australian fisheries, generally not all species have been subject 
to quota controls at the same time. In the south east trawl fishery, for example, ITQs were introduced 
for a limited number of species only. Additional species have subsequently been brought into the 
quota system, but for much of the period of the data the fishery was characterised by a mix of ITQs 
and unrestricted catches. Further, the TAC of many of the ITQ species was not binding for most of the 
period of the data. Under such circumstances, the fishery retains many of the open access conditions 
and licence/quota values would not reflect the discounted future profits (Batstone and Sharp 2003). 
 
Additional  problems  may  also  undermine  fishers’  confidence  in  an  ITQ  system.  These  include 
perceptions (real or otherwise) of cheating and illegal landings by other fishers as well as lack of 
confidence (or understanding) in the science underpinning TAC setting. A potential implication of the 
results is that changes in fisher behaviour may not be immediate by a move from open access to a 
property rights managed fishery. If perceptions of risk do not change for some time then investment 
behaviour is also unlikely to change. As a result, some of the key efficiency gains expected under an 





The objective of this study was to determine if the implicit discount rate – reflecting perceptions of risk 
in fisheries – was affected by the type of management system in place. An a priori expectation was 
that rights based fisheries would have lower implicit discount rates as fishers had greater certainty 
about future catches, and expectations about higher future profits due to the removal of the race to 
fish. From the available data, such a relationship could not be established. This does not mean that 
such a relationship does not exist – just that it is not apparent in the available data. From the work of 
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program.  Consequently,  fisher  behavioural  changes  may  not  be  immediate,  and  the  potential 
efficiency gains from an ITQ program may not be realised for some time after their introduction, even 
if all other aspects of the system are correctly in place (i.e. optimal TACs, efficient quota market). 
 
The study also attempted to apply standard financial models to examine risk perceptions in fisheries 
and  identified  several  problems  with  such  approaches.  While  some  of  these  relate  to  the  data 
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